

## Message Text

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 STATE 304574 TOSEC 250068

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UNCLAS STATE 304574 TOSEC 250068

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SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

1. HERewith FULL TEXT TOWNSEND HOOPES ARTICLE, OP-ED PAGE, NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 30, HEADED, "THERE IS NO OBJECTIVE NEED FOR THE CRUISE MISSILE."
2. WASHINGTON -- THE LATEST UNITED STATES PROPOSAL ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS, WHICH WAS MADE PRIVATELY IN SEPTEMBER BUT CAME TO THE SURFACE ONLY IN LATE NOVEMBER, SEEMS PATENTLY UNREASONABLE, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT OUR OBJECTIVE IS GENUINE ARMS CONTROL.
3. HAVING AGREED AT VLADIVOSTOK IN 1974 TO UNNECESSARILY HIGH NUMERICAL CEILINGS FOR OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES (MISSILES AND LONG-RANGE BOMBERS) -- 2,400 -- FOR BOTH SIDES, THE FORD ADMINISTRATION HAS NOW PROPOSED TO RAISE THESE CEILINGS EVEN HIGHER, TO ACCOMMODATE TWO OSTENSIBLY COMPARABLE WEAPONS -- THE SOVIET BOMBER DESIGNATED AS UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 304574 TOSEC 250068

THE BACKFIRE BY THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, AND

THE AMERICAN CRUISE MISSILE.

4. IN REJECTING THE AMERICAN POSITION, THE RUSSIANS HAVE CERTAINLY ASKED THE RIGHT QUESTION: "WHAT KIND OF LIMITATION DO YOU HAVE IF YOU RAISE CEILINGS EVERY TIME YOU DECIDE TO INTRODUCE A NEW WEAPON?"

5. THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL SEEMS BOTH FLABBY AND CYNICAL. FLABBY BECAUSE IT SHOWS THAT PRESIDENT FORD LACKS THE CLARITY AND FIRMNESS TO OVERRULE THE MILITARIST ELEMENTS WITHIN HIS ADMINISTRATION WHO OPPOSE ANY GENUINE ARMS BALANCE, WHO INDEED INSIST ON SOME INALIENABLE RIGHT TO TRANSFORM EVERY TECHNOLOGICAL POSSIBILITY INTO AN OPERATIONAL WEAPONS SYSTEM, NO MATTER WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES. AND CYNICAL BECAUSE IT REVEALS THAT SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER IS SO ANXIOUS TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM ON THE ARMS TALKS THAT HE IS WILLING TO SPONSOR A FORMULA HE KNOWS COULD ONLY EXACERBATE THE PROBLEM OF ARMS CONTROL.

6. THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL DISINGENUOUSLY IGNORES THE FACT THAT THE TWO WEAPONS AT ISSUE POSSESS RADICALLY DIFFERENT CAPABILITIES. THE BACKFIRE IS REALLY JUST ANOTHER BOMBER CAPABLE OF MAKING A SLOW, ONE-WAY RUN FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO THE UNITED STATES. EARLIER SOVIET BOMBERS HAVE POSSESSED SIMILAR MARGINAL CAPABILITIES, AND UNITED STATES MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAVE GENERALLY ACCORDED THEM THE PERIPHERAL ATTENTION THEY DESERVED.

7. IN THIS CASE, MOREOVER, THE RUSSIANS HAVE SOUGHT TO ALLAY AMERICAN SUSPICIONS BY PROMISING TO LIMIT THE BACKFIRE'S REFUELING CAPABILITY. IN ANY EVENT, IT IS HARD TO SEE HOW THIS AIRCRAFT POSES A GRAVE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES.

8. MOREOVER, FOR US TO INSIST THAT THE BACKFIRE BE INCLUDED WITHIN AGREED CEILINGS FOR STRATEGIC WEAPONS OBVIOUSLY RISKS THE CHANCE THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL RESPOND BY DEMANDING THAT ALL OF OUR NUCLEAR-DELIVERY CAPABILITY IN EUROPE ALSO BE INCLUDED.

9. AT VLADIVOSTOK, AFTER LONG AND TOUGH NEGOTIATIONS, THE UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 304574 TOSEC 250068

RUSSIANS FINALLY AGREED TO EXCLUDE OUR SEVERAL THOUSAND NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION BASED NUCLEAR WEAPONS, INCLUDING TACTICAL BOMBERS THAT ARE NOT ONLY CAPABLE OF DELIVERING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST SOVIET TERRITORY BUT WHOSE MISSION IS PRECISELY THAT. THIS WAS A MAJOR CONCESSION. WHY WOULD WE RISK REOPENING SO IMPORTANT AN ISSUE AFTER IT HAD BEEN SETTLED SO CLEARLY IN OUR FAVOR?

10. THE ANSWER IS THAT THE CRUISE MISSILE HAS BECOME A "MILITARY REQUIREMENT" FOR THE MYOPIC PENTAGON LEADERSHIP AND ITS ALLIES IN THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRY, AND THAT THEIR VIEW HAS PREVAILED OVER MR. KISSINGER'S OPPOSITION, BECAUSE PRESIDENT FORD HAS NOT REQUIRED THEM TO EXPLAIN WHY THERE IS ANY NEED TO ADD A VAST NEW DIMENSION TO THE EXISTING TRIAD OF AMERICAN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE POWER (LAND-BASED MISSILES, SEA-BASED MISSILES, AND BOMBERS).

11. THE NEW AMERICAN POSITION REPRESENTS A THINLY DIS-GUISED CAPITULATION TO THE PENTAGON. THE BACKFIRE BOMBER HAS BEEN DRAGGED IN AS A MAKEWEIGHT TO ACHIEVE AN ILLU-SORY EQUATION. WE OFFER TO RAISE THE CEILINGS TO ACCOMMO-DATE 200 BACKFIRES, AND IN TURN WE AGREE TO LIMIT OURSELVES TO 200 ADDITIONAL "LAUNCH VEHICLES" FOR THE CRUISE MISSILE.

12. TWO SEPARATE POINTS NEED TO BE STRESSED: (L) THE CRUISE MISSILE IS A WEAPON OF A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT ORDER OF MAGNITUDE; IT IS A LOW-FLYING, PILOTLESS AIRCRAFT CAPABLE OF BEING LAUNCHED FROM AIRPLANES OR SUBMARINES 2,000 MILES FROM THE TARGET, OF CARRYING LARGE NUCLEAR PAYLOADS, AND OF OPERATING WITH GREATER PRECISION THAN MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE RE-ENTRY VEHICLES (MIRVS). (2) THE PROPOSED LIMIT ON "LAUNCH VEHICLES" WOULD ADD 200 MORE AMERICAN BOMBERS OR OTHER AIRBORNE PLAT-FORMS TO THE CEILINGS WE AGREED UPON AT VLADIVOSTOK, BUT WOULD IMPOSE NO LIMITS WHATSOEVER ON THE PERMITTED NUMBER OF CRUISE MISSILES.

13. AS MR. KISSINGER HAS PREVIOUSLY POINTED OUT, THE UNITED STATES ALREADY HAS THE POTENTIAL TO DEPLOY 11,000 CRUISE MISSILES ON EXISTING BOMBERS AND TRANSPORT PLANES. IT IS HARDLY SURPRISING THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE REJECTED SO WHOLLY FRAUDULENT A PROPOSAL.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 STATE 304574 TOSEC 250068

14. THIS IRRATIONAL PUSH FOR THE CRUISE MISSILE ILLUS-TRATES A RECURRENT AND DEPRESSING FACT THE HISTORY OF THE ARMS RACE: THE PRONOUNCED UNITED STATES PENCHANT FOR RUSHING TO APPLY NEW AND REVOLUTIONARY WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY BEFORE THERE EXISTS ANY OBJECTIVE NEED TO DO SO.

15. WE HAD THE OPTION TO REFRAIN FROM A UNILATERAL DECISION TO MAKE MIRV'S AN OPERATIONAL REALITY IN 1969. HAD WE DONE SO, WE MIGHT WELL HAVE CONCLUDED THAT YEAR AN AMERICAN-SOVIET ARMS AGREEMENT PROHIBITING THEM. THERE WAS NO URGENT NEED FOR MIRV TECHNOLOGY IN 1969-70, AND LITTLE INDI-CATION THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD HAVE IMPLEMENTED FIRST.

16. HAD THEY THREATENED TO DO SO, WE COULD HAVE FOLLOWED

SUIT IN PLENTY OF TIME TO NEUTRALIZE THEIR PRESUMED ADVANTAGE. BUT WE FAILED TO RESIST OUR NATURAL TENDENCIES, SO EVERYONE NOW LIVES IN A WORLD OF ABUNDANT MIRV WARHEADS -- A CONDITION THAT HAS INCREASED THE DIFFICULTIES OF VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL BY EXPONENTIAL FACTORS.

17. THERE IS NO OBJECTIVE NEED FOR THE CRUISE MISSILE. LARGE-SCALE OVERKILL EXISTS IN THE NUCLEAR STOCKPILES ON BOTH SIDES. NO ONE NEEDS ANY MORE NEW OR MARVELOUS INSTRUMENTS OF DESTRUCTION. THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOT YET BEGUN TO DEVELOP A CRUISE MISSILE. THE UNITED STATES CAN THEREFORE STILL MAKE A MEASURABLE CONTRIBUTION TO STRATEGIC STABILITY AND POLITICAL SANITY BY KEEPING THIS PARTICULAR GENIE IN ITS BOX. LET US HOPE THE FORD ADMINISTRATION CAN SOMEWHERE FIND THE COURAGE AND PROPORTION TO MODIFY ITS PRESENT SENSELESS POSITION. (END TEXT) ROBINSON

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